Arthur Ruppin’s Concept of Race*

ABSTRACT

Focusing on Arthur Ruppin’s conception of race, I show that race was a stable category in his work—from his first published work in 1903 to his last one in 1940. While Ruppin’s overall understanding of race did not undergo major changes throughout his career, I argue that under the influence of German racial science, the volume of Ruppin’s writing on race in the 1920s and the 1930s increased. What makes Ruppin an especially interesting case is the coexistence found in his work between a deterministic racial outlook and his belief in humanism. In the first part of the article I establish race as a constant in Ruppin’s model showing that it ranges from an explicit category to social and demographic considerations that are interwoven with racial considerations. In the second part I place Ruppin’s conception of race in historical perspective and analyze its epistemological status.

On August 16, 1933 Arthur Ruppin wrote the following entry in his diary:

Through Dr. Georg Landauer I traveled to Jena on August 11 to meet Prof. Hans F.K. Günther, the founder of National-Socialist race theory. The conversation lasted two hours. Günther was most congenial but refused to accept credit for coining the Arian-concept, and agreed with me that the Jews are not inferior but different, and that the Jewish Question has to be solved justly.¹

What did Ruppin, the Jewish-German founder of academic Jewish demography and one of the founders of “Brit Shalom” look for in a meeting with Himmler’s mentor? What was the purpose of the meeting? How much did Ruppin know about Günther’s race theory and concept of the Jews? What was Ruppin’s opinion of Günther’s theory?² And why did Ruppin
not express his reservations of Günther in the privacy of his diary, but, on the contrary, describe the conversation as a pleasant encounter? Ruppin’s description of his meeting with Günther, the leading theoretician of race in Nazi Germany, was published in the German edition of his diaries (edited by Schlomo Krolik) but was omitted in the English edition (edited by Alex Bein). In the English edition an entry for the date of the meeting appears but without the passage relating to the meeting with Günther. The Hebrew volume (also edited by Alex Bein) entirely omits the entry for this date.³ Although Bein and Krolik displayed extreme sensitivity toward Ruppin’s complex positions on the “Jewish Question” and the “Arab Question” in their impressive editing of his diaries, memoirs, and letters, the reader will search in vain for a reference to Ruppin’s complicated and ambivalent positions on “race.”⁴ The meeting with Günther and the manner in which Ruppin reported it open a window, however, toward broader questions concerning the status of “race” in Ruppin’s work. Did Ruppin have a solidly formulated concept of race? If so, what is it? Was it a fixed concept, or did it develop throughout his career, and perhaps lose some of its importance for him over the years? What role did it have in his comprehensive sociological and demographic model and how was it linked to other variables? In a comparative framework, how does Ruppin’s concept of race compare with that of other writers? What is the connection between Ruppin’s and Günther’s concepts of race, for example? Finally, retrospectively, what was the fate of categories of research that were interwoven with race?

What fired my interest in Ruppin and race was a meeting with Etan Blum in the spring of 2004 when both of us were staying at the Simon Dubnow Center in Leipzig. At the time I was working on the role of assimilated Jews in the establishment of liberal branches of the social sciences and later I turned to Nazi racial science. Blum was studying Ashkenazim and Sephardim in the history of the Yishuv. In our conversations he claimed that the Eretz Israel Office and its director, Arthur Ruppin, the architect of Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel, had established the settlement activity on a racial theory that viewed Jews from Arab countries as inferior to those from European ones. This way Ruppin fixed the racial inferiority of the Sephardim and turned their discrimination into the cornerstone of the Zionist enterprise for generations. Since this article discusses Ruppin’s concept of race from the perspective of the history of the social sciences, I must point out the partiality of the following interpretation as far as Blum’s argument is concerned. It relates to the question of “racial theory,” as Blum describes it. My conversation with Blum was only the starting point of this article, and this article does not argue with him. The following article does
not focus on Ruppin the bureaucrat, and the reader must keep in mind that
the social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, were established
in the late nineteenth century, not only, and not primarily, as a means of
contemplating society, but in order to create, via sometimes contradictory
ways, the rationalization of society and better handling of social tensions.
My perspective is different from that of Blum. If his argument concerning
settlement policies is premised on a theory of race, then in my opinion his
necessary precondition is not met. In Ruppin’s specific case, the immedi-
ate social-political context of his ideas on “race” is mainly the question of
Jewish-Arab coexistence in Palestine and non-Jewish–Jewish coexistence in
Germany and Eastern Europe. With due caution regarding the fragmentary
nature of this interpretation, I wish to claim in the last part of the article
that in one context race is an impassable barrier and in another a bridge
to coexistence.

Ruppin began his professional career in a milieu in which “race” was
a central concept, especially regarding the Jews. From the last third of the
nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century, “race” was
a central category in the social sciences in Europe, and North and South
America. Anthropology in general, and physical anthropology in particu-
lar, were founded on “race.” However, precisely for this reason “race” was
not uniform nor was there an agreed-upon definition of race. “Race” was
many-sided, heterogenic, multi-branched, and filled with contradictions,
antitheses, and tensions. It is possible to point to a wide range of racial
theories in this period—from views of the human world as divided into a
hierarchy of races and sub-races to views that recognized racial differences
but denied their significance. Many authors believed in the principle of
“racial determinism,” that is, that race determines the potential of individual
members of particular racial groups. But others were convinced that there
was much more in common between members of different races than what
separated them. Because of these discrepancies in racial views, research,
especially in the English-speaking world, distinguished between “racist”
and “racialist” theories—a differentiation not without its problems. But the
research helps us perceive that not all racial theories are racist or to the same
degree. Also, regarding “racial purity,” a central concept mainly at the turn
of the twentieth century, we can point to diametrically opposite positions.
Some authors viewed “racial purity” as the supreme value for the health
of the race, and racial mixture as the main cause of human degeneration
in general, and symptomatic of the modern period in particular. Others
claimed that under certain conditions racial mixture was a blessing; still
others saw racial mixture as a fundamental advantage.
This spectrum of positions at the turn of the twentieth century was applied to the Jews’ racial features. Jews were represented as a race or subrace, a group with specific racial characteristics. This was the view stated in the highly influential anti-Semitic book by Houston Stuart Chamberlain, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. On the other hand, Jews were also seen as an assimilated heterogeneous group, a view that appeared in the comparative works of the most important liberal anthropologist of the period, Rudolph Virchow. Sometimes Jews were represented as a number of groups that had lost their common Jewish racial features because of centuries-long separation. However, the view that the Jews are an “anti-race” (a central claim in Nazi branches of anti-Semitism) can already be found. Even when specific characteristics were ascribed to the Jews, this was sometimes a positive statement, sometimes a negative one; in other words, it depended on the context. Actually, almost any possible combination of the above-mentioned positions was applied to the Jews. The rhetoric of race—sometimes an explicit view of race—was of importance primarily in the German branch of Zionism. When perusing Ruppin’s use of the term “race,” some of the contradictory forces that operated simultaneously in the early Zionist social sciences are likely to emerge. However, both Jews and non-Jews wrote about the Jews. The biographical dimension is important, but not exclusive. Various scholarly, political, and ideological agendas converge in a multiplicity of ways.

The picture that emerges from the study of Ruppin’s works is also complex and multi-layered. “Race” is present on a number of levels as an explicit category: from other sociological-demographic variables (into which racial considerations are interwoven) to the epistemological status of statistics in his work. An analysis of his works leaves no doubt that they contain a racial category that is linked both epistemologically and materially to his demographic and sociological work. What makes Ruppin an especially interesting case is the connection between his racial outlook, his humanist perspective of human nature, and his pragmatic view of conflict resolution.

Certain aspects of Ruppin’s legacy were studied thoroughly and comprehensively. There is no common agreement, however, on the significance of race for understanding Ruppin’s work. Two important studies published in recent years almost completely overlook the racial aspect in his work. In the index to Arthur Goren’s comprehensive biography of Arthur Ruppin, published in 2005, the word “race” appears on three pages of the almost five hundred and fifty page book. Goren regards the term as marginal to Ruppin’s work as a sociologist, a remnant of early twentieth century anthropological views from which Ruppin never freed himself. In an important
Arthur Ruppin’s Concept of Race

In the first part of the article I survey Ruppin’s ideas on race as they appear in his professional publications. I show that Ruppin accepted race as a valid category and viewed racial differences as significant. In the second part, I place Ruppin’s conception in the context of contemporary theories, analyze its epistemological status, and attempt to explain why parameters that were interwoven with race could nonetheless transfer relatively easily into later paradigms of Jewish demography that turned their back on “race.”

RACE IN RUPPIN’S MAIN WORKS

The concept of race is present in Ruppin’s research throughout his entire professional career—from his first book in 1903 to his last one in 1940. His view of race was more or less stable; he regarded it as a permanent and important human substrate. However, qualitatively and quantitatively it won increased significance in his later works of the 1920s and 1930s. Ruppin clung to this concept even after its political and scientific validity was increasingly under attack. The concept went through no major
conceptual development, but in two of his later works, from 1930 and 1940, he devoted much more space to it. Many of his ideas are reiterated, so, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition I will focus primarily on his major book that was published in 1930.

Ruppin’s first work, *Darwinism and Social Science*, discussed “race” within his inquiry into the relationship between Darwinism and the social sciences. Ruppin submitted the manuscript to a competition whose theme was “nature and society”, sponsored by the Krupp iron conglomerate. The committee chairman was Ernst Haeckel, sometimes referred to as the German Darwin who was also interested in race theory and eugenics. Another committee member was Dietrich Schäfer, a nationalist geographer whose almost forgotten name is now remembered chiefly for his violently anti-Semitic review that blocked Georg Simmel—one of Ruppin’s teachers at the University of Berlin—from obtaining a prestigious professorship at the University of Heidelberg. Ruppin’s manuscript won second prize and was published in 1903. A large part of the book surveys contemporary literature that deals with the connection between the natural and social sciences. The book occasionally refers to the Jews but does not focus specifically on them. Ruppin deals with the concept of race from various perspectives, paying special attention to the question of natural selection in its social context and to questions of heredity. Penslar notes that Ruppin’s social views were influenced by contemporary theories of Social Darwinism. It should be noted that the same complex position that characterizes his later works are already present in this book. In the controversy between biological determinism versus social influences, Ruppin sides with the deterministic wing. Here, however, he softens his position. For example, in his survey of literature he states that modern society interferes with natural selection because artificial technology enables individuals, who in previous generations would have perished, to survive. In other words, modern technology causes human degeneration. Ruppin does not deny the truth of this description but disputes its conclusions: that this is one of the most outstanding achievements of modern society. Unlike the deterministic views, according to which education and learning are futile, Ruppin believed that the state was obligated to provide social welfare and education. These are not opposed to the eugenic perspective but are its very expressions. Ruppin believed that the social sciences were independent of the natural sciences and had different considerations, that is, they were based on an anthropological-racial substrate. On a number of occasions he refers to racial difference as instinctive and to racial mixture as unnatural and undesirable. Nor does he conceal
his belief in the importance of heredity in the physical and mental features of adults. In this spirit he writes: “We cannot free ourselves of [our genetic load] just as we cannot escape our own shadow by way of a leap.”

The concept of race is essential in Ruppin’s first book on the Jews, *The Jews of Today* that appeared in 1904 in German. The second edition transforms the question of assimilation and national regeneration into the book’s organizing principle (Yossef Chaim Brenner’s Hebrew translation was made from this edition). But, in both editions, Ruppin discusses the racial characteristics of the Jews. Ruppin emphasizes that racial union is the Jews’ strongest bond. He claims that the Jews preserved a high level of racial unity throughout the generations (not to be confused with racial purity). He explains the Jews’ proximity to the peoples of the Near East. Race unites the Jews through space and time. Despite geographical distances, the Jews in the West and the East are close to each another. He emphasizes the continuity of the “Jewish type” for hundreds of years under conditions of geographical dispersion.

In the 1911 edition, the “Jews’ racial value” becomes even more essential to Ruppin’s discussion of Jewish nationalism. The explicit context of Ruppin’s discussion is the Jews’ right to exist as a separate national unit. Ruppin’s nationalist-Zionist view and his view of race are closely connected, especially with regard to assimilation. The Jews’ disappearance as a sociological unit is concomitant with racial assimilation. Here too, Ruppin accepts the validity of the deterministic racial theory, but cautiously reaches his conclusions. Regarding the progeny of interracial marriages, Ruppin accepts the discouraging view, but claims that the data are insufficient to determine if the offspring are physically and mentally inferior. He concedes that interracial offspring dilute the racial quality of the Jewish race and result in mediocrity. The focus of the discussion, however, is on the danger of Jewish assimilation. Racial uniqueness is a component of national uniqueness. The Jewish race is the bearer of Jewish culture. Ruppin was also the editor and founder of the *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden* [Journal for Demography and Statistics of the Jews]. Under his editorship numerous articles were published whose theme was Jewish racial difference, some of them from his own pen.

The combination of a softened deterministic perspective is also found in a 1919 article of his entitled “The Selection of the Fittest.” This article supports adopting a selective policy for immigration to Eretz Israel. The article opens with a discussion on the importance of the selection of human material. It continues with a discussion on selection based on profession,
health, and the exclusion of asocial elements. The framework of the entire article, as can be seen from the title, evokes eugenics. Ruppin relates to race in only one paragraph in the section entitled “Physical Selection:”

Another question that may be broached is whether the preservation of Jewish racial purity is at all possible. Since we desire to develop our Jewish side in Palestine, it would naturally be desirable to have only “racially pure” Jews entering Palestine. But a direct influence on the process by selecting those immigrants who most closely approach this racial type is not a practically possibility. On the whole, however, the general type in Palestine will probably be more strongly Jewish of the general type in Europe, for it is to be expected that the more strongly Jewish types will be the ones that are most generally discriminated against in Europe, and it is they who feel themselves drawn toward a Jewish community in Palestine.25

Ruppin’s immediate concern, however, is eugenic rather than racial.

It would of course be preferable if only strong and healthy persons came to settle in Palestine, so that we would be assured of a strong and healthy succeeding generation. Unfortunately this greatly desired objective cannot be implemented with such generalized simplicity, as the concepts ‘strong’ and ‘healthy’ are not particularly clear. Weak persons may in time become strong; for in many professions, physical strength and perfect health are of much less importance than mental and spiritual make-up; and, finally, in many cases a person’s constitution has nothing to do with the capacity to beget strong and healthy children. On these grounds we shall have to limit ourselves to the physical appurtenances of immigrants, and reject those individuals who are dangerous by virtue of some infectious disease (syphilis, advanced tuberculosis, etc.) or who are likely to become public charges (the mentally deranged, epileptics, and those who are prevented by sickness from making a living).26

Only in his comprehensive sociological works of 1930 and 1940 does “race” receive explicit conceptual discussion and broader quantitative treatment. The most developed quantitative and conceptual expression of this is found in The Sociology of the Jews.27 Ruppin states in the preface that he decided to include a short discussion on the question of “the Jewish race and [Jewish] racial characteristics” only after “having painstakingly and hesitatingly considered [the matter].” He goes on to say that “This theory is not in the fields of research close to me. If, despite this fact, I have written this preface—then it has been out of an awareness of its necessity.” Ruppin
concludes by asking the reader not to view the preface as “a finished section but an attempt at a clarification of the concepts.” He reviews “the Jews’ origins and race” and, from different perspectives, discusses the racial elements of the Jews in Eretz Israel, from the birth of the Jewish people in the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries BCE. At the beginning of the chapter, Ruppin refers to Günther and tries to counter his implied claim that Christ was Nordic rather than Jewish.28

Ruppin, however, rejects some of Günther’s empirical claims but not his methodology. In a manner similar to Günther and other scholars of race (such as Eugen Fischer and, in a completely different manner, Franz Boas) Ruppin categorizes the Jews’ affiliation to “the Near Asian racial type” whose racial roots are Aramaic, Philistine, and Bedouin.29 Günther determines the Nordic presence from features in statues, paintings, and other plastic arts that he interpreted as Nordic. This is a “realistic” reading of art and cultural artifacts. Ruppin, too, is convinced of the correlation between representations in various art forms and contemporary Jews. Unlike Boas and his students, who rejected this “realistic” method, Ruppin views Günther’s book as a treasure chest of material.30 In some cases he probably relied on Günther’s empirical sources. Ruppin concludes that the Jewish “type” exhibits a strong continuity, especially as regards the Aramaic element from the sixteenth century BCE to contemporary anti-Semitic caricatures.31

Ruppin accepted the standard German distinction between the classification of human groups according to languages and according to race. This distinction emphasizes that the two classifications do not coincide. But, by the 1920s, this discernment had branched off into two distinct and opposing directions: cultural anthropologists employed the distinction to focus on the language and culture, while racial scholars used it to concentrate on race. In this section of the book, Ruppin made the distinction in order to focus on race.32

Ruppin’s discussion concentrates on the racial characteristics of the Jews, only briefly inquiring into the concept of race. In the first chapter he notes that he uses “the most accepted racial divisions in anthropology.” He points out that “the division into races, sections, and branches is conditional. Instead of dividing humankind into various classes according to skin, hair, eye color, and craniology, [humankind] could also be differentiated according to other physical characteristics.” Ruppin states that people of all races can breed with one another, therefore races cannot count as “types” in Linnaeus’ sense. He notes that “the division of man into races, branches, and sub-branches is flawed because different races have gradually become linked by a gradual transition from one type to another, and that some people’s
race is difficult to identify.” Boas and his disciples also raised this claim on many occasions. But they brought it up to emphasize that races are found on a long continuum, and that intra-racial differences are greater than interracial ones. According to Boas and his students, these race theories err in ignoring large areas of overlap between diverse races. “Racial types” are based on extreme cases. Ruppin asserts that “the system of race shows us a way through the abyss of individual differences and offers the possibility of linking to groups those types that are closer to them.” Ruppin testifies to the veracity of the notion of “racial type.” The difficulty in determining the race of particular individuals is merely an empirical difficulty.

Unlike Günther, Ruppin refuses to see an obligatory link between the races’ physical and mental characteristics. Nonetheless, he notes that “natural and social selection” has led to the development of special physical and spiritual characteristics by eliminating the elements that failed to adapt to the environment and by improving the characteristics that are “most beneficial to the struggle for survival.” Ruppin rejects Günther’s claim that culture can only be created by Norse people. As for the Jews, and the continuation of the Jewish type from ancient times until the present, Ruppin notes that the spiritual characteristics of the Jews have changed in the course of generations because of the penetration of foreign racial strains and because of processes of selection and adaptation. We can find in these statements a strange amalgamation of the deterministic racial views of the period: Ruppin looks to Günther, Fritz Lenz, Otto Bauer, and Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss. But there are also echoes of the view of their main opponent, Boas, even though he is not mentioned by name. The specific characteristics that Ruppin attributes to the Jewish racial composition are of less importance in our context. Note, however, that these characteristics are found in all “peoples of ancient cultures” such as the Chinese, but not in “young peoples” that “are still governed by the law of drives.”

The historical survey in racial terms of the Jews dwelling outside of Israel has a direct impact on his demographic and sociological project. If Ruppin believes that the Jewish type is permanent, he must explain the differences among Jews living in different Diasporas. As he saw it, a similar process took place in each of the large centers (Babylonia, Spain, Poland). First foreign racial elements penetrated the Jewish community; then came a long period of inbreeding until “nearly all the individual differences in these respective areas were erased over the centuries.” Ruppin concludes: “We call the three Jewish groups—the Babylonians, Sephardim, and Ashkenazim original Jewish types. From the racial point of view each group is made up
of the three racial bases, from whom the ancient Jews in Eretz Israel were comprised. Only the proportion changed.”

This racial model has immediate implications for Ruppin’s demographic and sociological work. First, based on racial identification, some racial groups find themselves outside the Jewish racial type. Ruppin calls these groups “special types.” These include the Jews of Yemen, Caucasia, and Bukhara. Ruppin characterizes the difference between them and the rest of world Jewry in racial terms. In addition, he recognizes “foreign types” that emerged through intermixture with northern Europeans.

The racial perspective leads Ruppin to investigate the Jewish people’s degree of adaptation to their various environments. The racial differences are smaller where the dominant races are made up of similar racial elements. They are biggest where the dominant races did not partake in the evolution of the Jewish type. This is particularly the case in Northern Europe. Ruppin classifies the Jewish groups according to their degree of racial proximity to nations in whose midst they dwell. The degree of proximity is critical for peaceful relations between different populations. Ruppin, like many others, sees a problem where Jews live in the midst of peoples whose racial make up is very different from theirs. This seems to be Ruppin’s and Günther’s common ground: that a solution to the Jewish problem must include the Jews’ removal from Northern Europe.

This procedure has implications, on the basis of which Ruppin differentiates between those whose racial origin is Jewish but for historical reasons are no longer considered part of the Jewish collective, and those who are not racially Jewish but are part of the Jewish national body. On the basis of the first part of this distinction, Ruppin reviews the Samaritans, Karaites in Crimea, Marranos in Portugal, Doenmeh in Saloniki, and Jedid in al-Islam in Persia, and other Caucasian tribes. On the basis of the second part, Ruppin surveys the Falashas in Ethiopia, Black Jews of India, Chinese Jews, and converts to Judaism in Russia and Eretz Israel.

Here, however, lies a major difference between Ruppin and Günther. Günther’s lifelong project was the development of a meta-national racial perspective, since the Nordic racial basis cuts across national groups. From an analytical point of view, Günther gives priority to the racial dimension over the national one, whereas Ruppin is interested in the national aspect. Günther is the theoretician of the Nordic race; Ruppin the sociologist of the Jewish people.

One of the most salient topics in Ruppin’s works, mixed marriages, is intricately interwoven into race. He points out that the avoidance of mixed
marriages is deeply engrained in the Jewish people. “What began only as an expression of racial feeling eventually transformed into a religious admonition.” Ruppin notes that the withdrawal from religion does not, in itself, threaten the Jewish people’s future. The situation regarding mixed marriages is different. Mixed marriages “carry out an excision from the Jewish body.” Ruppin’s sociological premise is that these marriages result in a decrease in the number of Jews in the world since far fewer than half the children born in these marriages retain an affiliation to the Jewish religion. Ruppin also opposes them because they obfuscate the Jewish racial type. Quantitatively, “the assimilation of Jewish blood into the Christian body is so insignificant that it cancels itself out and, in effect, is of no importance whatsoever.” However, the infusion of non-Jewish blood into the Jewish people blurs Jewish racial uniqueness.42 (Note that the penetration of Jewish racial elements into non-Jewish peoples elicits a deep fear in Günther.)

The Jews’ War of Survival, Ruppin’s last book, came to press after WWII broke out and information arrived about events in occupied Poland. Nevertheless, this book retains ideas on race no less than his earlier works do. The book’s subject matter is a continuation of Ruppin’s life-long research. He again distinguishes between religion, nationality, origin, and race as separate variables. Before turning to Ruppin’s discussion on race, I would like to examine the way he treats Nazi race laws. Ruppin notes that “according to the law of 1933, even those who no longer professed to the Jewish religion were considered Jews.” Ruppin further states that “this law was designed to return converts and the children of mixed marriages to Judaism, and introduce a kind of restitution in regnum, that is, a return to the previous condition. In this way they [the Nazis] are returning to Judaism those Jews who had been lost to it because of increased assimilation in Germany.” Ruppin arrives at the conclusion that if National Socialism’s definitions had been accepted by the entire world, then the number of Jews would have been greater by one million people. This description was published one year after the outbreak of WWII and five years after these laws were legislated, leading to the disintegration of German Jewry. Ruppin could not have imagined in his wildest dreams that Nazi Germany’s policy would soon turn to the systematic extermination of those people who were now registered as Jews. But, given the situation in 1940, it is difficult to regard Ruppin’s statements as anything other than insensitive and unfortunate in the extreme.43

In 1940, Ruppin still regarded race as a vital substrate in the social sciences. Even in this book, Ruppin continues to put his faith in the cornerstones of Nazi race theory (for instance the Fischer-Bauer-Lenz textbook) but he no longer refers to Günther. His view that peoples and races are never
identical and that peoples can be characterized as specific racial mixtures is taken directly from Günther. Ruppin still refers to the racial composition of the Jews and reaffirms their racial characterization. He continues to examine the main Jewish types, including half-Jewish populations, foreign types, and their mental differences. Ruppin concludes with a discussion on the great dangers looming over the Jewish people, both demographically and racially, because of mixed-marriages.44

After his treatment of anti-Semitism, Ruppin turns to “the subversive power of assimilation.” “Anti-Semitism,” he writes, “intends to strangle the Jews through pressure and political and economic decrees. Assimilation damages and weakens the internal solidarity of the Jewish public.” Ruppin concludes that “between the millstones of anti-Semitism and assimilation, the danger of erosion can be expected to overtake Judaism.”45 The title of the book, The Jews’ War for Survival, discusses the persecution of the Jews, but even more than this, even in 1940, the danger of assimilation.

THE POSITION OF RACE IN RUPPIN’S EPISTEMOLOGY

Race, then, is a stable variable in Ruppin’s work. In this part of the article I will locate Ruppin’s conception of race in relation to race concepts of the period and analyze its epistemological status.

If we wish to position Ruppin’s view, a brief historical-conceptual background is necessary. “Race” is an essentialist category that attributes positive characteristics to members of a group in terms of “a specific difference.” In the case of race, specific differences are those that distinguish the members of a particular group (the Jews) from a larger one (humanity) to which its members belong. Thus, any use of “race” is essentialist. But the intense controversy in the social sciences, especially in anthropology, in the first half of the twentieth century, did not deal with “race” in general but to a much greater degree with the principle of “racial determinism.” That is, it did not challenge the existence of differences, it challenged their significance. Therefore the deterministic view of racial differences could be rejected without denying their existence and without rejecting the concept of race in toto (Boas is a prominent example).46 Racial determinism, as a concept and research category, was a kind of watershed, a linguistic “shifter” that scientifically, ideologically, and politically crisscrossed anthropology in the period under discussion.

The liberal school, under the leadership of Rudolph Virchow, that dominated German anthropology until the twentieth century, opposed
racial determinism. But a younger generation that held the deterministic views gradually and increasingly assumed prominence. This trend occurred long before 1933; already in the 1920s German anthropology was on its way to becoming “racial sciences.” In the United States, on the other hand, Boas pursued the liberal German tradition. Therefore, American anthropology was split between Boas’s view and the deterministic view (especially in the evolutionary version, compared with the German version that was “pluralistic” [pluralism in the sense of plurality]). The studies of Boas and his pupils did not deny racial differences; they claimed that they were marginal vis-à-vis cultural differences. Boas and his disciples gradually began to analyze racial differences in specific social situations. British functionalist anthropology focused on questions of social functions in group organizations and demonstrated less explicit interest in race. Ruppin operated within the traditional German framework.

He believed not only in racial differences, but that they were crucial to the potential of the individual and the collective. The difficulty in situating Ruppin on the map of racial concepts in this period is mainly because of the discrepancy between his concept of race and political positions identified with racial determinism, and because of the absence of what in many respects was the core of deterministic racial theories: the belief in an inherent and fixed hierarchy of races. There is nothing in Ruppin’s works that refers to the superiority of the Jews over others; he denies the theories that support Nordic superiority. However, he offers no discussion of racial hierarchy itself.

Ruppin’s racial perspective did not change fundamentally between 1903 and 1940, but he may have produced a greater volume during the 1930s and 1940s under the influence of the flowering of German racial scholarship. The social sciences and anthropology diverged in the 1920s, and the link between deterministic racial views and political and ideological views became more explicit. There was a close tie, difficult to mistake, between radical anti-Semitism and deterministic views of race, and in a supplementary way, the greatest opponents of anti-Semitism in the social sciences and anthropology were those who also fought against deterministic views. The internal lines of division in this field were not necessarily national, ethnic, or religious, even though these were certainly variables that no historian could ignore. Germans and Americans, and Jews and Christians who followed the principle faced Germans and Americans who opposed it. Ruppin stood on the side of those who supported the principle.

The picture becomes even more complicated. In the 1920s, Ruppin conceived of an anthropological institute in Jerusalem for studying heredity
and race. The institute was intended to be part of The Hebrew University or affiliated with it. Ruppin corresponded with Judah Magnes and Radcliffe Salaman, an Anglo-Zionist anthropologist whose fame rested mainly on his widely-known book on the history of the potato. Salaman's views of race were more outspoken than Ruppin’s. Salaman’s brother-in-law was Charles Gabriel Seligman, the first professor of ethnology at the University of London. Ruppin wanted to ensure that the institute gained a distinguished reputation. It is interesting to note that the names mentioned in this correspondence were Paul Radin, Melville Herskovits, and Robert Lowe—three Jewish-American anti-deterministic cultural anthropologists. The institute never materialized, but we observe that although Ruppin advocated a deterministic view, all the leading names he considered were staunch anti-determinists.

The question that interests me is not the fate of Ruppin’s explicit racial category, but the categories into which race was interwoven, such as mixed marriages and the demography of world Jewry. Goren has recently claimed that race should be seen only as the shape of the standard contemporary discourse. Shortly before Goren, DellaPergola showed that Ruppin’s model was still valid a century after his first book was published. DellaPergola agrees that Ruppin held certain racial views, but he does not regard them as inherent to Ruppin’s sociological model or even essential to it. In my opinion, DellaPergola is right, but only in light of later developments. First, the explicit racial aspects were discarded; second, the belief underwent a transformation. I will demonstrate this by discussing the status of statistics in Ruppin’s work.

Statistics was a central objective-scientific tool for studying empirical social reality when Ruppin began his research, and “race” was the chief social-scientific category. Scientific-theoretical research and the rationalization of the means of dealing with social tensions converge in statistics, and this is the basis of bureaucratic implementation. Statistics is perceived as expressing unmediated truths of social reality. In Ruppin’s case, as with other Jewish scholars, statistics is intended to be an answer to anti-Jewish prejudices. At the same time, the Zeitschrift and statistical bureau that Ruppin headed were not designed to serve any Jewish faction, but “the totality of Judaism and humanity, science, and truth.” Ruppin did not juxtapose race and statistics as different things, but the one (statistics) expressed the other (race) in measurable quantitative terms. Ruppin explicitly stated this on more than one occasion. For example, in his first work, he noted that “race-view is done by means of statistics.” In the article “The Jews’ Racial Pride,” Ruppin confronted anti-Jewish accusations by attributing them to
different measurable areas that could then be refuted. In the realm of morals, for example, he claimed that the only way to prove that Jews are morally defective is through criminal statistics. Ruppin demonstrated that the Jewish pattern was different from (rather than worse than) the non-Jewish one. Criminal patterns express racial differences.

Statistics as a scientific method matured in the nineteenth century in the midst of bitter debates (from astronomy to social sciences). It appeared as a mathematical tool that revealed stable patterns. Statistics does not necessarily reveal anything of the individual case before us, but it is a powerful tool for studying cases in general, according to the laws of probability. The controversies over the statistical method were also harsh and bitter because they directly or indirectly touched on various conceptions of “man” and “society” as they emerged from the patterns of statistics—on the “average,” the “typical,” the “normal,” the “pathological,” and the “accidental.” These arguments dealt with the connection between regularity and causality. Is there a causal law that underlies the statistical findings? The statistical method—especially the study of variation in observation termed “the error law”—served as the definition of “type.”

During the nineteenth century, statistics was applied to race in various ways and sometimes for opposite aims. In this deeply racialized context, statistics was also applied to the Jews. Ruppin applied the statistical method that he acquired during his studies in Germany. He did not view himself as an innovator in the field and he paid no special attention to its methodological or epistemological status. But historians of science have shown how the statistical method gained an autonomous status during the nineteenth century, which explains the connection between Ruppin’s statistics and “race.” “One can explain something by using a statistical law,” states Ian Hacking, “only if it is in some way autonomous, and not reducible to some set of underlying causes.” Thus, “Statistical laws became autonomous when they could be used not only for the prediction of phenomena but also for their explanation.” In other words, we will look in vain in Ruppin’s work for a transformation of the statistical data on birthrate, mixed marriages, Jewish types, education, professional dispersion, and crime relate to race. Statistics does not teach us about the racial aspects of the Jews but is itself the racial explanation.

Statistics has a constitutive dimension. The researcher’s subjects, variables, and segmentation create research categories and social norms: intra-Jewish, for example. Ruppin’s discrimination, according to Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Babylonians, and “special types” such as Yemenites and Bukharans, reflects social and cultural values of the period, but also
contributes to their creation and serves to implant them. Many of Ruppin’s variables continued in later Jewish demographic paradigms. Some things that were connected to race in Ruppin’s paradigm could be discarded by later generations. This was the case concerning the separation of various Jewish populations according to their degree of proximity to or distance from “the Jewish racial type,” or the differentiation among Jews according to religion and/or race.

The situation is different for differences expressed statistically. A helpful way to appreciate the status of statistics is by a brief comparison with photography. In his book *The Sociology of the Jews*, Ruppin used photographs to illustrate variations in the Jewish racial type. The epistemological status of the photographs in Ruppin’s paradigm is not essentially different from that of his statistical tables. But the clearest difference between photography and statistics is found in the photograph’s realistic dimension. A racial type cannot be photographically represented without reducing the photographed individuals to the illustrated types. This reduction is invalidated in later anthropology, and this form of photography died out. Not so with statistics. The exact transformation process from Ruppin to later paradigms merits closer historical attention. However, I believe many of Ruppin’s parameters could persist into later paradigms without any difficulty because their epistemological status, their underlying grounds, underwent a transformation. These parameters were not inherently racial, although Ruppin believed they were. In the later paradigms they were perceived as related to social—not racial—differences.

In conclusion, I would like to return to Ruppin’s relationship with Günther. We have seen that Ruppin regarded Günther, a radical anti-Semite and Nazi race theoretician, as a professional authority. But Günther viewed “race” in a completely different way from Ruppin. “Race” for Günther was not just one of many variables, but a regulative principle to which all others were subordinated. In political terms, Ruppin’s project was nationalist, whereas Günther’s was international. Ruppin held race to be the substance of the Jewish national collective. Günther saw race, in the final analysis, as a biological-mystical essence and the basis of an inevitable apocalyptic struggle for world mastery. The difference between the two men is also highlighted in their attitude on specific issues. Günther was opposed to mixed marriages because, based on his understanding of Mendel, he believed these could only produce racial hybrids (“bastards” are individuals composed of two incompatible essences). Ruppin was convinced that union between individuals of far-removed races would have negative implications, and he regarded mixed marriages as a danger to the Jews because of the huge
quantitative differences between Jews and non-Jews that would result in the disappearance of Jewish existence. Günther was interested in the biological aspect; Ruppin mainly in the demographic ramifications.

Despite the significant differences between them, Ruppin never expressed reservations about “race,” not even about Günther’s conception of race. The main point in our context, I believe, is that Ruppin did not recognize the close connection between the racial sciences and anti-Semitism. He perceived anti-Semitism as a social phenomenon that he could analyze with his social scientific tools; he did not consider racial sciences as part of this phenomenon but as a branch of science. In other words, he viewed racial sciences not as part of the problem, but as part of what might help in its solution. In my opinion, this point is important for understanding Ruppin’s meeting with Günther. Unlike later Zionist historians who regarded racial anti-Semitism as another episode—though an especially dangerous one—of the ancient and unique hatred of the Jews, Ruppin distinguished between anti-Semitism and racial sciences. Ruppin believed that the social sciences can contribute to the solution of anti-Semitism. Thus, an encounter between a Zionist social scientist and even a Nazi can be of practical value. This is the practical backdrop to the meeting. Ruppin was highly versed in the racial sciences of the period but, in my opinion, he had a profoundly mistaken conceptualization of Günther. The essence of Günther’s theory, I believe, escaped him.

Ruppin believed that human groups, including the Jews, had particular racial characteristics. But this view had a different implication in the Near East and Northern Europe. On the basis of the racial difference between Jews and Northern Europeans, Ruppin thought that the future of Jews in that part of the world was blocked. The situation was different regarding coexistence between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. In 1923 he wrote: “We have to reenter the circle of nations of the East with our racial brothers the Arabs (and Armenians) in order to create a new cultural unity in the Near East; it seems to me that Zionism is justified more than ever if only because of the Jews’ racial affiliation with the nations of the Near East.” In Northern Europe, the Jews’ racial difference is an impenetrable obstacle, but in the Near East it is a bridge for their integration. Race, then, is an important research category for Ruppin, but this does not make him a racist and most definitely not a theoretician of race in the Nazi sense.

Following the Nazis’ criminal role, “race” lost the last vestiges of academic legitimacy it enjoyed in the social sciences in the 1920s and 1930s. Prior to this, race had been a complex and multi-branched concept, and a central element in representations of Jewish existence. From the beginning
of his scholarly labors until the day of his death in 1943, Ruppin believed in the validity of the concept of race. As we see it today, racial determinism on the one hand, philosophical humanism and political pragmatism, on the other, seem like an ethical and conceptual oxymoron. Perhaps this tension is anachronistic. The exact moment in which one era changes into another is sometimes elusive. At times the iron-clad systems of beliefs that characterize an era are only visible in retrospect. Indeed, there are different types of past: some persist into the present while others die out. However, precisely those that do not extend into the present confront us with their strangeness and force us to recognize that contradictions, oppositions, and tensions may be time-bound and that the antinomies of today are not necessarily those of yesterday.
Caption: Diagram of Jewish Racial Populations
Source: Arthur Ruppin, *The Sociology of the Jews*, p.9 (Tel-Aviv, 1930) [Hebrew].
See Ruppin’s descriptions on pg. 23
See Ruppin’s descriptions on pg. 22
Ruppin’s descriptions:

**East European**
- 43. Russian Jew
- 44. Polish Jew (Mediterranean features)
- 45. Russian Jew
- 46. Russian Jew
- 47. Russian Rabbi
- 48. Russian Jew (Mediterranean features)
- 49. Russian Jewess (note her “Japanese” features)
- 50. Lithuanian Jew
- 51. Lithuanian Jew (Mediterranean features)
- 52. Russian Jew (Mediterranean features)
- 53. Russian Jew
- 54. Polish Jew

**Germany**
- 55. Jew from Berlin
- 56. Jew from Baden
- 57. Jew from Brunswig
- 58. Jew from North Germany (North European)
- 59. Jewess from Berlin
- 60. Prof. Albert Einstein (Mediterranean features)

**England**
- 61. Lord Reading (former High Commissioner to India)
- 62. Sir Herbert Samuel

**Eretz-Israel**
- 63. Jewess born in Jerusalem (Sephardi father, Ashkenazi mother)
- 64. Jewess born in Eretz-Israel (parents from Russia)
- 65. Ashkenazi Jewess, born in Jerusalem (Russian father, mother from Safed)

**United States**
- 66. Jew from New York, parents from Galicia
- 67. Jew from New York, parents from Galicia (brother of 66 Mediterranean features)
Notes

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1. See the Central Zionist Archives [hereafter: CZA] A107/954. Ruppin’s laconic description raises questions about the meeting with Günther and the peculiar way in which he recorded it. Some points leap off the page at the reader. First, the use of the term: “the Aryan-concept” (Arierbegriff) in one word is not commonly employed. Furthermore, the use of this term in the context of the meeting with Günther is curious because Günther systematically rejected the term “Aryan” as pertaining to language groups and employed the term “Nordic,” for dealing with racial ones. As we shall see, Ruppin was familiar with Günther’s work, so it is unlikely that he was unaware of his terms. Did they use the “Aryan concept” in their conversation? Did Ruppin record his conversation employing a term other than the one they used in their conversation? Also, the terms that Ruppin used when referring to Jewish difference raise questions. Ruppin notes that he and Günther rejected the view that Jews are “inferior” (minderwertig). But in his report, Ruppin employs a very uncommon term whose literal translation is “different in value” (anderswertig) rather than the more commonly used “different in kind” (andersartig). The term that Ruppin uses lacks the harsh connotations of “inferior” in German, but still implies a difference in “value,” that is, “of lesser value.” In discursive terms, too, Ruppin’s description raises questions. There is a certain contradiction between the extraordinary formal “by means of” (Auf Veranlassung von), that could have expressed Ruppin’s reservations over Günther, and his friendly description of the meeting and their agreement on the need to settle the Jewish question. Furthermore, Ruppin’s phrasing stresses that Günther agreed with him, not the other way around (that is, the initiative of the wording, so to speak, is Ruppin’s). The Ruppin Archive contains material that shows that the two men corresponded briefly. Günter thanked the Zionist Federation of Germany for Ruppin’s book that they sent him. At the end of the letter to Friedrich Komer (dated February 13, 1934) Günther asks him to convey to Ruppin that following their conversation he will inform the minister, Wilhelm Frick, of the proposals raised during the conversation regarding a “solution [Regelungen] to relations between Jews and Germans” to which Frick responded positively.
2. Günther was brought to the University of Jena in 1930 by the regional National-Socialist government headed by Wilhelm Frick. As one can learn from Günther’s file in the Berlin University archives, in 1935 Professor Eugen Mittwoch was forced out of the Department of Semitic Languages to allow Günther a place in the University of Berlin. On Günther’s importance in Nazi Germany’s Judenforschung, see Alan E. Steinweis, *Studying the Jew: Scholarly Antisemitism in Nazi German* (Cambridge, MA, 2006) particularly 25–41. See also my “Method, Project, and the Racial Characteristics of the Jews: A Comparison of Franz Boas and Hans F. K. Günther,” *Jewish Social Studies*, 13(1) (2006).


15. In this work, Ruppin occasionally relates to the terms anthropological and biological as synonyms, and contrasts them with the social sciences. See Ruppin, *Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft*, 8.


20. *Ibid.*, 102, see also 45, 98. This book was published in 1903 before Mendel’s Laws, rediscovered in 1900, were established as the foundation of modern genetics. Ruppin follows August Weissman’s (pp. 56–58) theory of heredity. Ruppin opposes Lamark’s view that acquired traits could be passed on (p. 50).


27. Arthur Ruppin, *The Sociology of the Jews*, 2nd ed. 2 vols. 4 parts. (Tel-Aviv, 1934) [Hebrew]. This book appeared in German as *Soziologie der Juden* (Berlin, 1930) and is practically identical with *Die soziale Struktur der Juden* (Berlin, 1930). Goren claims that during his stay in New York Ruppin insatiably read Franz Boas (without reference). The New York Library has no visitor reading cards archive so it is impossible to corroborate or refute Goren’s claim. However, Ruppin referred to Boas only once in *The Sociology of the Jews*, 3:71. He refers to Boas’ early 1910 study that focused on the question of the plasticity of racial types among children of immigrants to the United States. Ruppin claims that the changes were caused by the environment, but were limited racially. Ruppin again refers to Boas (and rejects his position) in a lecture in 1926. His notes appear in a manuscript in CZA 107/590. My impression is that in the 1920s, Ruppin came closer to the deterministic branches of anthropology—those branches that Boas so bitterly contested. It is not entirely unlikely that Ruppin came upon Boas’s work through Günther’s references to him. Note that the Boas study to which Ruppin refers is the only one to which Günther referred. Furthermore, the issue that Ruppin discusses is the same one that Günther discusses. Hans F. K. Günther, *Rassenkunde des jüdischen Volkes* (Munich 1930) 290.
29. *Idem*.
32. *Ibid.*, 8 and diagram on page 9. Ruppin emphasized that based on linguistic classification the Jews are Semites, whereas racially they belong to the Armanoid race that was connected to groups that spoke Indo-Germanic languages.
33. *Ibid.*, 10
38. *Ibid.*, 19. Ruppin borrows not only the concepts but also their meaning, from Günther, 20.
40. This view was formulated by Eugen Fischer in his early twentieth century study on the mixed offspring of the Boers and Hottentots in Africa, and became a standard reference on the subject. Fischer became the father of Nazi genetics. See Christopher M. Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich* (New York, 2005) 65.
41. Ruppin, *The Sociology of the Jews*, 1:23; “Die Mischehe,” *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden*, 4(2) (1908) 17–23, 74–77. Ruppin expressed similar positions in earlier publications, for example, in his 1908 article on mixed marriages. In the first part of the article he distinguishes between Jews of race (“Juden”) and Jews of religion (“Israeliten”) (p. 18). Because of the nature of mixed marriages, Ruppin believed that all of the Jews who were Jewish by religion were Jews according to race, but not the other way round. More and more Jews who were Jewish according to race were not Jewish according to religion. (p. 18) Similar differentiations are found in Günther’s writings on the Jews. Compare with Günther, *Rassenkunde des jüdischen Volkes*, 305–306.
45. Ibid., 207.
50. Ruppin’s position raises questions about the historical interpretation connected with the “implicature” (a notion from pragmatics that refers to what the listener, or in this case the reader, understands although it was not explicitly stated). Can deterministic positions be adopted without their implicature, that is, without their hierarchical dimension?
51. Apparently after Ruppin participated in the international genetic conference in Berlin, he wrote in his diary (September 14, 1927): “I am becoming increasingly aware of the extent to which the Jews’ return to Eretz Israel and agriculture should be seen as a primary eugenic phenomenon.” CZA, A107/1953. Parallels from 1926 testify that Ruppin acquired a *Tasterzirkel* (anthropometer) from Alig & Baumgärtel (a German company for anthropometric equipment) that was adapted from the system of the race theoretician Rudolph Martin from Munich. CZA, A107/592. There are also brochures announcing new publications from J.F. Lehmanns Verlag—the ultra-nationalist, leading racial studies publishing house—with Ruppin’s signs.
53. CZA, A107/589. According to Ruppin, the urgency in the establishment of an institute was due to the conspicuous concentration in Eretz Israel of diverse Jewish types from the four corners of the world who are already in the process of mixing that will soon result in the blurring of original types. CZA, A107/590. Harvey Goldberg has recently discovered in American archives important correspondence relating to the establishment of the institute. See “The Science of Judaism and the Science of Man: Some Jewish Threads in the History of Anthropology,” in Eli Lederhendler and Jack Wertheimer (eds), *Text and Context Essays in Modern Jewish History and Historiography in Honor of Ismar Schorsch* (New York, 2005) 294–303.
54. Goren, *Arthur Ruppin*, 431, asserts that regarding the racial aspects “they were assumptions—the basis of anthropology that Ruppin absorbed during his university studies and that have placed a great burden on his work, and today appear absolutely unnecessary.” See also pp. 489–490.
56. For the historical, scientific, cultural, and Zionist context for the founding of Jewish statistics, see Hart, *Social Science and the Politics of Modern Jewish Identity*, 28–73 (particularly 56–73) and John M. Efron, *Defenders of the Race: Jewish Doctors and Race Science in Fin-de-Siècle Europe* (New Haven, 1994) 166–174.


59. Arthur Ruppin, “Der Rassenstolz der Juden,” *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden*, 6 (1910) 92. Ruppin also quantitatively examined the commonly held claim that there are many talented people among the Jews, but no genuine geniuses.


64. Francis Galton termed the system of “composite photography” that he developed, “pictorial statistics.” See David Green, “Veins of Resemblance: Photography and Eugenics,” *The Oxford Journal of Art*, 7(2) (1985) 14. When Ruppin visited East Europe as a young man, he photographed extensively. During the 1920s, he intended to publish a book made up mostly of photographs of “Jewish types in Eretz Israel” (see Ruppin’s diary, November 23, 1925 and *Chapters in My Life*, 3:0–09). Some of the material can be found in the CZA in Box A107/941). Ruppin’s book on racial types was never published, but *The Sociology of the Jews* has an appendix of “racial type” photographs. There are boxes in the Central Zionist Archives that contain a large quantity of visual material (especially photographs and newspaper clippings) that Ruppin seems to have collected for his book. Ruppin may have been influenced by Francis Galton (who coined the term “eugenics” and invented the system of individual identification by means of fingerprints) and wished to extend the fingerprint method to racial difference. See Ruppin’s diary, November 23, 1925, and *Chapters in My Life*, 3:108–109). Ruppin tried to interest the Berlin police in this matter in a letter dated September 29, 1929, but he was rebuffed. CZA, A107/591.


66. Ruppin, “On the Jews’ Racial Pride,” 92. Ruppin adds that the Jews’ fusion with Graeco-Roman peoples does not present a problem because there is sufficient racial proximity (Idem.). This implies that commingling with northern European nations does present a problem.

67. See, for example, Shmuel Ettinger, *Anti-Semitism in Our Times* (Tel-Aviv, 1978) [Hebrew].
68. CZA A107/952 is quoted in Goren, *Arthur Ruppin, His Life and Work*, 403. On the proximity to the Armenians, see Arthur Ruppin, “Juden und Armenier,” *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden*, 2(12) (1906) 177–181. We find in this statement, again, the mixture of a deterministic racial perspective with a humanistic dimension toward the bitter opponents of the Zionist enterprise. Ruppin saw the Jews’ natural affiliation with the Middle East as the source of their (secular) legitimacy to Eretz Israel. However, it must be emphasized that the Jews’ racial proximity to other peoples in the Middle East is subordinate, analytically and politically, to the national point of view. Racial proximity is secondary to national differences. Notes on race appear sporadically in Ruppin’s diary, and the subject undoubtedly interested him. See, for example, his notes on Brazil and Argentina in *Chapters in My Life*, 3:244–245.