

**Recent Trends in Emigration from Israel:
The Impact of Palestinian Violence**

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Prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Association for Israel Studies, Jerusalem, Israel, June 14-16, 2004. I wish to thank Michael Grosack for his research assistance on this project. (*updated somewhat from original*)

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Traditional Approaches and Problems in the Study of Emigration

Jewish emigration from Israel has always been sensitive and susceptible to sensationalism. This can hardly be surprising in a country accustomed to defending its very right to exist against charges of illegitimacy and which, in that context, treats every immigrant and emigrant as a kind of participant in a perpetual referendum on the country's chances for survival. Discussion of Jewish emigration from Israel (or from Palestine before 1948), known within the Zionist ideological lexicon as "yeridah" ("going down") has seldom been systematic. In sharp contrast to the cornucopia of statistical information provided by Zionist and Israeli institutions over the years regarding almost every detail Jewish immigration into Israel, official Israeli sources contain almost no consistent, annual information about rates of emigration from the country or profiles of those leaving.

The scarcity of information regarding emigration is mainly due to political and social sensitivity of the subject. To be sure, it is intrinsically more difficult to count emigrants from a country than immigrants into a country, especially if what is of interest is the number of decisions to leave permanently per year is the datum of interest. For example, fewer emigrants than immigrants announce their intention at the country's border. And how long must a resident reside abroad before any country should consider him or her an emigrant? ¹

In the case of Israel, however, it is quite obvious that the main obstacle to assessing emigration trends has been the reluctance of official bodies, including the Central Bureau of Statistics, as well as Israeli demographers and other experts, to devote explicit attention to the issue. For example, the Central Bureau of Statistics regularly publishes extensive data on population growth in Israel. This includes annual data on natural increase and "migration balance." The immigration figures that go into the migration balance number are analyzed in great detail, but the Statistical Abstract does not offer an explanation of where the number subtracted from immigration to provide the "migration balance" comes from, only that it is an estimate.

In the 1950s and 1960s, indeed until the early 1970s, the Statistical Abstract did list emigration figures. Subsequently the practice was suspended, even though the "migration balance" numbers implied that the information was still being gathered. For the last twenty years the Statistical Abstract has avoided using the term "emigration."² Instructively, the Statistical Abstract also avoids discussion of the implications of various

estimates of emigration for their population projections. Looking ahead to 2020, the CBS projects three population distributions by age and population group using three different assumptions about fertility and “migration balance”—yielding “high, medium, and low variants.” Although the balance between emigrants and immigrants is not specified, and although exact formulas for producing these variants are not provided, the projections are said to be based on “the assumption...that the number of immigrants for the total projected period is between 745,000 to 975,000.” It should be noted that even this “low variant” assumes 50,000 immigrants per year, which is one and a half times more than the total immigration to Israel in 2003 and approximately five times the “net” immigration (subtracting emigrants from immigrants).³ The political sensitivity of these calculations is also apparent in the common practice by which analysts who focus on the demographic problem standardly consider the implications of Arab emigration from the territories as well as different scales of Jewish immigration. Seldom, however, do they consider the demographic implications of Jewish emigration.⁴

When the topic of emigration has been discussed, two variables are most commonly cited as driving ups and downs in emigration rates. The first of these is the economic situation in the country. For example, in 1926, 13,000 Jews entered Palestine, but more than 6,500 left the country. Misha Louvish’s explanation for this rise in emigration was the “severe economic crisis” in Palestine. Its implications continued in subsequent years. In 1927 there were 6,000 “yordim” compared to only 3,000 “olim.” In 1928 the numbers of olim and yordim were roughly equal at 2,000. Louvish emphasizes the crucial role of economic assistance and public works programs implemented by the Jewish Agency in stemming this trend and returning to a surplus of immigrants over emigrants in 1929. Overall he sees these patterns as “a striking illustration of the close connection between conditions in Palestine and the rate of aliyah.”⁵

The second prominent explanation for emigration is to explain increases in emigration rates as associated with a recent or simultaneous large influx of immigrants. For example, Sergio DellaPergola explains the spike in Jewish emigration from Israel in the early 1990s by referring to the massive wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union that reached its peak from 1989-1992. “Emigration from Israel,” writes DellaPergola, “reached an estimated 15-20% of the total volume of immigration - a comparatively low amount in the experience of major immigration countries.”⁶

In this paper I do not quarrel with the importance of these explanations for Jewish emigration rates. My objective, however, is to consider the extent to which the security situation, associated with wars and terrorism on the one hand, and periods of peace negotiations and enhanced prospects for peace on the other, can be seen as having a significant impact on levels of emigration from Israel. In this respect I am continuing the pioneering effort of Yinon Cohen who also questioned the determinativeness of the economic factor. He argued in 1988 that although the conflict with the Arabs had traditionally increased Jewish-Israeli solidarity, thereby militating against emigration, the breakdown of the Jewish political consensus on policies toward the Arabs beginning after the 1973 war had, and would continue, to encourage Israelis to emigrate based on considerations of the likely impact of the conflict on them personally.⁷ Of course these

two possible drivers of emigration (economic and security factors) cannot be entirely disentangled since there may be a strong association between a difficult security situation and a painful period of economic stagnation.

Recent Trends in Emigration from Israel: Perceptions and Measurable Realities

This question of the scale of Israeli emigration, which is to say mainly Jewish emigration, has been raised by a recent spate of articles as to whether the collapse of the Oslo peace process, the high levels of violence associated with the al-Aqsa Intifada, and/or the associated economic downturn in Israel, have contributed significantly to a rise in emigration that could have demographic or political implications. The high levels of immigration in the early 1990s, especially from the former Soviet Union, have disappeared, with fewer than 22,000 immigrants registered for 2003. Other reports indicate that since 2002 no more than 30% of these immigrants have been classified by the government as Jewish.⁸ In mid-2003 it was reported a “moribund” annual rate of 1,000 immigrants from North America, with 50% of them leaving Israel after their arrival.⁹ The head of manpower for the Israel Defense Forces reported in mid-2003 that 34% of Israelis of conscription age were not serving in the army. Five per cent of those, he noted, were Israelis who “left the country prior to their recruitment and lived abroad.”¹⁰ Wide attention was paid to the departure of 1,000 of the 7,000 Argentine immigrants who had come to Israel since 2001 as part of an emergency rescue program.¹¹ In Haaretz Aluf Benn, reported sharp increases in Israelis applying for citizenship papers at the German, Polish, Czech, Austrian, and Slovakian embassies in Israel in 2002 and 2003.¹² A Market Watch poll commissioned by the newspaper Maariv in January 2002, found 20 percent of adult Israelis had recently considered living in a different country and that 12 percent of Israeli parents “would like their children to grow up outside Israel.”¹³ Other articles have included reports that dozens of children of leading politicians and ministers are living abroad, that school registration figures for American Israelis are dropping and moving sales of their property proliferating,¹⁴ and that Israelis are moving substantial savings into foreign bank accounts, and buying up property abroad.¹⁵

In November 2003, Haaretz published a lengthy interview with Avraham Burg, former Speaker of the Knesset, Chairman of the Jewish Agency, and a leading candidate for the head of the Labor Party prior to the last elections. Burg, son of the venerable NRP leader and Minister of the Interior Yosef Burg, shocked many Israelis with an article he published in the International Herald Tribune entitled “A Failed Israeli Society is Collapsing.” In this interview Burg expanded on his blunt assessment of the country’s prospects and the propensity of many upper class Israelis to leave the country.

When you ask Israelis today whether their children will be living here 25 years down the road you don’t get an unequivocally positive answer. You don’t hear a booming yes. On the contrary: Young people are being encouraged to study abroad. Their parents are getting them European passports. Whoever can checks out possibilities of working in Silicon Valley in California; whoever has the wherewithal buys a house in

London. So that slowly but surely, a society is developing in Israel which isn't certain that the next generation will live here. A whole society is living here that has no faith in its future.

What is actually happening is that the leading Israeli class is shrinking, because it is no longer ready to pay for the caprices of the government. It is no longer willing to bear the burden of the settlements and the burden of the transfer payments. But what we're getting in the meantime is not a revolt in the streets, it's a quiet revolt of people leaving, getting out. It's a revolt of taking the laptop and the diskette and moving on. So if you look up and look around, you will see that the only people who are staying here are those who have no other option. The economically weak and the fundamentalists are staying. Before our eyes Israel is becoming ultra-Orthodox, nationalist and Arab. It is becoming a society that has no sense of a future, no narrative and no forces to maintain itself.¹⁶

Burg's analysis was echoed from a very different political direction by Arnon Soffer, a leading Israeli demographer, and a scholar who has focused more attention on the demographic balance between Arabs and Jews in the country than perhaps any other expert. In an analysis published in 2001, but perhaps written prior to the appearance of the second intifada, Soffer wrote about the stresses that rapid growth spurred by immigration had produced and raised the possibility that emigration of Jews, especially, "high quality" Israelis, might become a problem.

Rapid demographic growth has brought with it social deterioration...such a continuing situation will not be acceptable to a part of the Jewish citizenry...who can be absorbed in the West without difficulty. They will consider emigrating to countries with a higher quality of life (the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Western Europe).¹⁷

After two years of the Al-Aqsa intifada Soffer added new sentences to this passage in a new edition of the same work, reflecting the actual appearance, in his view, of emigration as a demographically significant phenomenon.

[T]here is indifference on the part of the core groups to what is going on in the country in general and to critical issues, such as participation in elections, conscription into the Israel Defense Forces, and military reserve duty. Others take their money abroad, where they purchase apartments or seek dual passports, even in countries like Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania.

There is a fear that at a certain moment, an economic dislocation or a violent event will cause the beginning of a mass abandonment by Jews from these areas, and the State of Israel might then lose this region...¹⁸

With immigration dropping and emigration perceived to be on the rise, Israeli attitudes toward “yordim” have changed. Both inside and outside the government one hears the term much less often than ten or even five years ago. Indeed the official term for Israeli citizens who have emigrated is “Israelis Living Outside the Country” (“Yisraelim haHayim Chutz le’Aretz”). This group, now estimated at between 450,000 and 900,000 (depending in part on whether children born outside the country are included or not) has now replaced the former Soviet Union as the most promising pool for Jewish immigration into Israel. Hearings on problems associated with attracting these potential immigrants held by the Committee on Absorption of the Knesset in 2003 presented an opportunity for the public to hear official government figures for emigration. According to representatives of the Central Bureau of Statistics testifying before the committee, 270,000 Israeli citizens had emigrated between 1990 and 2001, including 68,000 of those who immigrated from the former Soviet Union. This is a rate of 1 emigrant for each 3 immigrants.¹⁹ Yet in January 2004, MK Yuri Shtern, Chairman of the Knesset Interior Committee, asserted that these figures underreported the problem, because, he said, they “did not include statistics for yeridah in the last two years, during which the number of those abandoning the country for Russia has increased very significantly.” “Moscow,” he continued, “was full of young Israelis looking for work.”²⁰ Nor did it help reassure Israelis to hear the Foreign Minister of Australia in May 2004 announce, while visiting Israel, that he personally supports Israeli foreign policy toward Arafat and the separation barrier, but also wished to encourage any interested Israelis, but especially those who are young and highly skilled, to leave the country and move to Australia where the absorption process for Israelis has been made particularly quick and easy.²¹

Public reaction to the emigration phenomenon is difficult to gauge, but it would appear that this round of anxiety may be significantly different than others. To be sure, one still does hear traditional formulas, especially from the extreme right. Thus in an interview broadcast on Arutz Sheva, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Dr. Aryeh Eldad, an ex-IDF Chief Medical Officer, argued against the tendency to refer to departing Israelis as “emigrants” rather than as “yordim.”

True, it's a very painful phenomenon; it is found among some who did not receive the correct education, leading to a weakening of their roots and rendering them vulnerable to uprooting by 'common winds' - not to mention the very strong winds of the present period... Regarding the Second Aliyah [1904-14, when 40,000 Jews came], there is a dispute whether [half or many more people] left... But those who remained are the ones who left their imprint on the State of Israel for generations to come. It's a sort of Darwinian process, in that those who remain are the strong ones who leave their imprint on future generations and on the national character, while the ones who run are the weaker ones. It will be easier for us to fight and survive without those who, in one way or another, support our enemy... There are of course those who leave not out of ideology, but out of a genuine fear - but again, those who remain will forge the national character.²²

However, the signs of change and even desperation are evident among wide segments of the population, including among circles on the extreme right who have always resisted the demographic argument as evidence of a lack of authentically Zionist vision or faith in the future and in the Jewish people. But within the last two years the extreme right has joined most of the rest of Jewish Israeli society in depicting Palestinian terror and the demographic threat as the two main challenges confronting Israel. Yisrael Harel, a veteran Gush Emunim activist and former editor of *Nekuda*, published a long and stunning article in April 2003 which depicted the demographic spectre as Israel's most daunting problem and even went so far as to propose a solution which would include not only Egyptian and Jordanian acceptance of masses of Palestinian refugees, but also Israeli abandonment of the Gaza Strip, the central heavily Arab areas of the West Bank. The article began as follows, in language formerly almost never heard on the right. "The Jewish majority between the Jordan and the sea is disappearing day by day, and without an absolute Jewish majority the State of Israel will not be able to survive for long. Security for an absolute Jewish majority is a crucial foundation for any plan..." Harel concluded by rejecting transfer as impossible and by emphasizing that "every solution [to the Palestinian problem], that does not guarantee a Jewish majority in the Land of Israel is no solution."²³

Other signs of demographic desperation, associated with reports of high and steady Arab rates of natural increase, plummeting immigrating figures, include the wholesale conversion and transfer of "Beni Menashe" immigrants from India and Peruvian Indians to West Bank settlements by leading Rabbis, dedicated efforts by Rabbi Haim Druckman, a veteran Gush Emunim leader, along with Yuval Ne'eman, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and Jewish Agency head Sali Meridor, to devise quick and easy conversion procedures for thousands of non-Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union,²⁴ and suggestions by Interior Minister Avraham Poraz that non-Jewish non-Arabs, including foreign workers, who are willing to fight in the army, be given citizenship.²⁵

To conduct my own informal assessment of public attitudes I analyzed comments posted at the Maariv newspaper website in response to an article about emigration published on January 20, 2004. The article reported on the Knesset Absorption Committee debate referred to above. Within two weeks there were a total of ninety-six different comments posted (in Hebrew or English) in response to the article or in response to comments on the article. I discarded 16 comments that were either humorous, off topic, or unclear as to their meaning. That left 80 distinct substantive comments by Maariv readers, including, of course, readers living outside of Israel. Of greatest interest was that only sixteen of the 80 (20%) reflected traditional Israeli attitudes toward "yeridah." These comments offered harsh criticism of emigrants or those threatening to emigrate because of difficult conditions. Six comments were patriotic expressions or suggestions that the current wave of emigration was really not so serious as it seemed to some. However, the great majority of the comments did consider the problem very grave. Twenty-one comments (26%) justified the decision to emigrate and urged others to do so. Of these eight explicitly referred to the political or security

situation as intolerable while three others cited economic conditions. Twelve (15%) expressed an urgent desire to do something to staunch the flow of Israelis out of the country. Another twelve expressed sympathy and understanding of the reasons why Israelis leaving were doing so.²⁶

Such an analysis does little more, however, than corroborate the general impression one gets from anecdotal evidence and interviews with Israelis living in Israel or abroad. In his recent book, *The Israeli Diaspora*, Steven J. Gold relies almost entirely on interviews in his exploration of the motives for Israeli emigrants. He lists “burnout,” disillusionment, and ethnic and political conflict, and reports the specific impact of the Rabin assassination and the al-Aqsa intifada. But these motives are presented along with other standard economic and social network explanations of migration. Gold avoids making generalizations about trends.²⁷

As noted, the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel does not publish annual emigration figures, per se. But there are several techniques for inferring changing amounts of emigration. Figures 1-3 display different ways to estimate annual emigration rates from Israel.

Figure 1




Figure 2






Figure 3



From these data it can be seen how widely the estimates of Israeli emigration annually can be, even when relying on official Israeli sources. The difficulties thereby created are compounded by the unavailability of data in some categories for 2002 or 2003. It should also be stressed that these data describe “Israelis” not “Jewish Israelis,” meaning that, most relevantly, they include data on non-Jewish, non-Arab immigrants and emigrants.²⁸ Nevertheless, some observations can be made.

The data in Figure 3, although only from five years, is difficult to reconcile with that displayed in the other figures. This is probably explained by the comment in the Statistical Abstract from which the data was drawn that “because of errors in the recording of border movements, data on persons staying abroad for more than 12 months, and on persons who returned after an extended stay, have been based on estimates only.” The data in Figures 1 and 2 suggest that emigration has been highest in absolute terms in the early 1980s and in the early 1990s. However, as noted above, rates of emigration should always be expected to rise after large influxes of immigrants (see Figure 4), since a portion of all immigrants standardly decide they have made a mistake and rather quickly return to their countries of origin or depart for other countries. For the purposes of this investigation into the relationship between the political/security situation and Israeli emigration, it would be preferable to eliminate these “drop-outs.” Such considerations make the sharp apparent rise in emigration in the early 1990’s (Figure 2) less impressive, while suggesting greater significance to the rising emigration rates in the early 1980s and in 2001 and 2002 (since those years and just prior years were not years of very high immigration into Israel).

Figure 4



Before considering whether the pattern displayed by Israeli emigration corresponds to economic, security, and/or political trends, we can turn to other sources of information to try to establish a clearer pattern of Israeli emigration. Since we are primarily interested in Jewish emigration that does not spring from decisions by recent immigrants to return to their former countries of residence, we would on the whole prefer to eliminate migration flows between Israel and the Former Soviet Union, understanding that very large proportions of those flows, including more than half the immigrants arriving from FSU since 1996, have not been Jewish. One way to do this is to consider Israeli emigration data registered in receiving countries such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.²⁹ Figures 5-9 provide data on citizenship granted to Israelis by those four countries.

Figure 5




Figure 6






Figure 7



The United States is the most important destination for Israeli emigrants. But US quotas that limit immigration make this data less interesting than it might otherwise be. However, data on Israeli applications for citizenship in the United States are not affected by these limits and provide a more direct measure of the inclinations of Israelis to emigrate. These data are provided in Figure 8.³⁰

Figure 8



Overall we can detect a pattern of rising Israeli emigration to Australia, the United States, and Canada beginning in 2000.³¹ The pattern is not as distinct for New Zealand (where the numbers are, in any case, quite small in absolute terms). In general, considering both these receiving country data and the data reported earlier from Israeli sources, but especially the data in Figure 2, the pattern of a decrease in emigration in the period 1997 to 1998 and an increase after 1999 is fairly well established.

[We can now compare this pattern to economic and security related data. Figure 10 displays patterns of per capita domestic production and consumption in Israel from 1991 to 2002. Each of these curves shows a significant rise from 1999 to 2000. GDP per capita then dips in 2001 and 2002, but per capita consumption remains at 2000 levels. Significantly, each of these curves is essentially flat between 1996 and 1999.] **I believe we decided not to use this.**

Figure 10 displays Israeli fatalities inflicted by Palestinians annually from 1987 to 2003. The pattern here is quite striking. Israeli fatalities rise in the most violent final years of the first intifada, in 1992 and 1993 and continue at high levels during the 1995 and 1996 period, including the suicide bus bombings that ensued after the liquidation of

the “Engineer” in Gaza. Fatalities then declined sharply to historically low levels in the period 1997-1999, but rose very sharply to unprecedentedly high levels following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in the fall of 2000.

Figure 9






Figure 10



What is significant is how closely this pattern of Israeli deaths due to the conflict with the Palestinians corresponds to the emigration pattern traced earlier. Thus, if we are to rely on per capita domestic product and private consumption as operationalizations of the hypothesis that changing economic conditions have been primarily responsible for recent increases in Israeli emigration, and if we rely on Palestinian inflicted fatalities as an operationalization of the hypothesis that changing security conditions have been primarily responsible, we are constrained to conclude that security concerns appear to have been a more potent driver of Israeli emigration patterns in the last eight years or so than have economic factors.

Of course this conclusion can only be tentative. Decisions to emigrate may lag significantly behind events. This could mean that recent increases reflect factors present in previous years, but may also suggest that even though fatalities decreased in 2003 and are being registered at a lower rate still in 2004, we may still see higher emigration rates for the next two to three years. It is also the case that our emigration data lags because of delays in collection and reporting. It is also possible that the bulk of recent increases in emigration may be a reflection, not of Israelis actually leaving the country, but of higher numbers of Israelis who are abroad deciding not to return. Indeed, we have some data on this point, which is particularly important because arrivals of Israeli citizens from abroad do represent discrete actions taken in the particular year of immigration. So a rate of return that has been declining since the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada would support the analysis offered here. Indeed that is what we observe in Figure 11.

Figure 11



Conclusion

The evidence strongly suggests, but does not conclusively indicate, that the security situation as it deteriorated during the al-Aqsa intifada did indeed substantially increase rates of emigration from Israel. While it is difficult, for reasons mentioned earlier, to disaggregate Jewish from non-Jewish emigration, it would appear, according to official figures available for 2002, that the net immigration of Jews into the country (that is excluding immigrants not classified as Jews by the government and after subtracting the CBS estimate for Jewish emigration) was only 9300. In light of the likely over-counting of Jews among immigrants from the FSU (who make up the large majority of immigrants) and the poor quality and “year-nonspecific” technique used by the CBS to estimate emigration, it is quite likely that the real net immigration of Jews into Israel in 2002 was either near zero or negative. At this point, however, with the security situation appearing to recover, at least in comparison with 2001-2003 fatality levels, and notwithstanding declining immigration prospects, there is no immediate reason to believe that a sudden “rush to the exits” may be imminent.

On the other hand, the reality of tightening American visa and immigration restrictions against aliens, including Israelis, means that substantial numbers of Israelis who are considering leaving and who are in a professional position to do so, may act sooner rather than later out of fear that their opportunity to move may disappear. The possibility of such a “tipping point” toward emigration is a politically important and dangerous fact. For one thing, perceptions that Palestinian violence produces Jewish emigration could serve as rationales for Palestinian terrorists trying to convince other Palestinians of the rationality of their actions. One can also assume that Palestinians inclined to compromise with Israel because of their belief, ingrained by a century of “Iron Wall” tactics by successive Zionist and Israeli leaders, that a Jewish state in Palestine is a permanent Middle Eastern reality, might well abandon that willingness if a cascade toward emigration of Jews encouraged the belief that time was on their side in the national conflict. It is in this context that escaping, not from the “demographic problem,” per se, but from a situation which could well unleash either a demographically significant cascade of emigration or encourage perceptions that such a cascade is likely, becomes itself a high order political imperative with immense implications for the form and timing of a settlement with the Palestinians.

Notes

¹ The United Nations rule of thumb is one year, but should this include students? diplomats? middle managers employed by multinational firms?

² According to Ms. Laura Staetsky, whose responsibilities at the Central Bureau of Statistics include research on migration issues, the annual emigration figures are actually computed by subtracting arrivals in year 2 from arrivals in year 1 at Israel's various border crossings. Since this technique does not distinguish among particular returnees by time of departure, there is no way for this number, offered annually, to be seen as an accurate reflection on a year by year basis of the number of Israelis who emigrated or decided to emigrate, or who even came to fit the category of emigrant, in that particular year. Interview with Laura Staetsky, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, May 1, 2004. For a detailed explanation of CBS procedures for estimating emigrants in the mid-1980s see Yinon Cohen, "War and Social Integration: The Effects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on Jewish Emigration from Israel," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 53, no. 6 (December 1988) pp. 911-12.

³ Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Vol. 54, 2003, p. 28.

⁴ See for example, "The Demographic Problem," Arutz Sheva, internet, February 4, 2004, <http://www.arutzsheva.com/news.php3?id=57296>. See also Neuman, "Aliyah to Israel: Immigration under Conditions of Adversity," p. 17, who attributes the increase in the proportion of Arabs in the country in the first half of the 1990s, despite the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union, to "high fertility rates" among the Arabs, with no mention of the high emigration rate of Jews as a factor.

⁵ Misha Louvish, "Aliyah (1880-1939)" in *Immigration and Settlement* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1973) p. 39 [13-34].

⁶ Sergio DellaPergola, "Demography in Israel/Palestine: Trends, Prospects, Policy Implications," paper presented to the IUSSP XXIV General Population Conference, Salvador de Bahia (August 2001) p. 9.

⁷ Cohen, "War and Social Integration," (1988) *op. cit.*. A version of this paper is also available as "Demographic Trends in Israel and Palestine: Prospects and Policy Implications," in *American Jewish Year Book 2003*, Vol. 103, David Singer and Lawrence Grossman, eds. (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2003) pp. 3-68.

⁸ Shmuel Bloom, "Societal Time Bomb in Israel," Based on interview with Yosef Mendelevich, *The Jewish Week*, November 21, 2002. Accessed at <http://www.tzemachdovid.org/amechad/societal.shtml>.

⁹ Netty C. Gross, "They Just Needed a Little Help," *The Jerusalem Report*, July 28, 2003, p. 16.

¹⁰ Israeline, electronic news summary, distributed by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 24, 2003.

¹¹ *The Jerusalem Report*, January 12, 2004.

¹² Benn reported, for example, that from an annual baseline of approximately 1300 citizenship applications per year, the German embassy dealt with 2,366 in 2002 and had already dealt with 1,622 in the first half of 2003. Aluf Benn, "European Dreaming," *www.haaretzdaily*, November 13, 2003.

¹³ Sylvana Foa, "Israelis Contemplate the Unthinkable—Moving Out: Escaping the Hell of the Holy Land," *Village Voice*, February 13-19, 2002. See also a report on surveys done of Arab and Jewish students in Israel at Oranim College by David Mittelberg (with L. Lev-Ari). "Identity and Interaction among Jewish and Arab Students in Oranim College: Towards Multicultural Education?" Identity and Interaction Among Jewish and Arab Students at Oranim: Towards Multi-Cultural Education?" Division of Research and Evaluation, The 4th Convention of Teachers - Research, Oranim College of Education, May 2002, Tivon Israel. For an abstract of this study, see <http://www.iis2003beijing.com.cn/en/AS/S5-14.htm>.

¹⁴ Michele Chabin, Americans Part Of Growing Exodus, *The Jewish Week*, July 18, 2003.

¹⁵ Tippi Israeli, "The Israeli Community Abroad," *Yediot Acharonot*, March 17, 2002.

¹⁶ Ari Shavit, "On the Eve of Destruction," *Haaretz English Edition*, November 13, 2003. On this theme see also the editorial of David Horowitz, "He's Winning," (referring to Yasser Arafat). Horowitz is editor of *The Jerusalem Report*. The editorial appeared in the Report's October 20, 2003 issue and reported that "A stream of veteran Israelis... is flowing overseas."

¹⁷ Arnon Soffer, Israel, *Demography 2000-2020: Dangers and Opportunities* (Haifa: University of Haifa, 2001) p. 39.

¹⁸ Arnon Soffer, Israel, *Demography 2003-2020: Dangers and Opportunities* (Haifa: University of Haifa, 2003) pp. 42 and 49.

¹⁹ Shoshana Neuman, "Aliyah to Israel: Immigration under Conditions of Adversity," IZA Discussion Paper Series, no. 89, Bonn, Germany, p. 14. This rate is actually lower than during the twenty-three years from 1967 to 1989, when 500,000 Jews immigrated into the country while 244,000 emigrated, a rate of approximately 1 emigrant for every two immigrants.

²⁰ Mimeo, dated January 21, 2004. According to Russian Chief Rabbi Berel Lazar, 50,000 Russian immigrants to Israel returned to Russia between 1998 and 2004. See The Jerusalem Report February 9, 2004.

²¹ Maariv, May 13, 2004. Interview with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer.
<http://www.maarivintl.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=article&articleID=1828>

²² "Yeridah Will Strengthen The Nation In The Long Run," Arutz Sheva, Mar. 21, 2002.

²³ Yisrael Harel, "In Praise of a Regional Solution," Nekuda, #261 (April 2003), pp. 42-49.

²⁴ "Jewish Agency Plans Fast-Track Conversion for Immigrants from CIS," distributed electronically in Israeline, by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 7, 2003.

²⁵ Arutz Sheva, "Knesset Controversy Over Absorption In Yesha" Jun. 18, 2003; "How 90 Peruvians became the latest Jewish settlers," The Guardian, August 7, 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/comment/0,10551,770315,00.html>; "Poraz Continues To Provoke," Arutz Sheva, May 5, 2003; Michael Freund, "Finding Lost Jews," The Jerusalem Post, September 12, 2001.

²⁶ Comments on article by Arik Bendor in Maariv, January 20, 2004, <http://www.maariv.co.il/channels/1/ART/633/732.html>.

²⁷ Steven J. Gold, The Israeli Diaspora (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002) pp. 31-58.

²⁸ There is very little immigration and emigration of Arabs from Israel. Estimates of Palestinian emigration from the West Bank and Gaza hover near 150,000 since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada. During the previous five years there was a net immigration of Palestinians into these areas.

²⁹ Data retrieved from:

New Zealand. New Zealand Immigration Service. "Residence Decisions by Financial year." 2003. 31 March 2004. <http://www.immigration.govt.nz/Research/Statistics/Statistics.htm>

Australia. Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics Number 21 1990-00. 2002. 13 April 2004. http://www.immi.gov.au/statistics/publications/publications_main.htm

Canada: "Canada: About 9,000 Israelis Emigrated since 2000," Haaretz, August 13, 2003

USA: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 2003.

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2001. U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 2002. (as well as Yearbooks for 1987, 1991, and 1987).

³⁰ I would like to thank the staff of United States Embassy in Tel-Aviv for their assistance in providing this data.

³¹ The figures for the years preceding those displayed for Canada are considerably lower—a total of 2705 from 1996 to 2001. "Canada: About 9,000 Israelis Emigrated since 2000," Haaretz, August 13, 2003. The data for the United States describes new "permanent residents" from Israel. The relatively high peaks for emigration from Israel to the United States in the early 1990s should be discounted because of the effects of "drop-outs"—immigrants from the FSU who left shortly after their arrival for the United States.